Firstsun Capital Bancorp
FSUN on Nasdaq. FirstSun sells deposit, lending, treasury, wealth, and online banking products to businesses and people. Market value $1.1bn.
Price checks use the past 12 months to June 2026. Some use the latest annual report instead, as marked. Quality checks use five annual reports, the latest for the year to December 2025.
We can't read total debt from the filing, so debt is left out.
Should I look at this?
Worth a closer look
Why it could be worth it
What to watch out for
Nothing stood out in the numbers we check.
This is not advice. Check the numbers below.
Yearly profit per dollar of owners' money: 9 cents. Above 10 is good.
What you pay for each dollar of net assets: $0.60.
Profit per $100 you pay: $4.27.
Quality score: 86 of 100. Price score: 76 of 100. Our list needs 70 on quality and 60 on price.
$39.19 a share, 31% above its 1-year low
Over the past year the price has ranged from $29.95 to $42.34.
Dividend: 0.7% a year
Paid in its latest year
Payouts have jumped around in recent years, so this may not repeat.
Prices from Tuesday’s close (6 October).
Five years of cash, in billions
| Revenue | |||||
| Revenue | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Operating margin | |||||
| Operating margin | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Debt to equity | |||||
| Debt to equity | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Shares outstanding | |||||
| Shares outstanding | 0.02bn | 0.02bn | 0.03bn | 0.03bn | 0.03bn |
Health checks
- Free cash flow positiveDoesn't apply to banks and insurers
- Accounting checksDoesn't apply to banks and insurers
- DebtDoesn't apply to banks and insurers
- Revenue growth, five yearsUnknown
- Buying back its own sharesNo, 12% more shares since 2021
The quarter to June 2026
How the business did, compared with the same quarter a year earlier.
- A loss of $23 million, after a profit of $26 million a year ago.
- Spare cash over the past 12 months: $1.2 billion, up from $87 million.
- 65% more shares than a year ago. Each share owns a bit less of the company.
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $22m |
| December 2024 | $16m |
| March 2025 | $24m |
| June 2025 | $26m |
| September 2025 | $23m |
| December 2025 | $25m |
| March 2026 | $22m |
| June 2026 | -$23m |
From the company's quarterly reports to the SEC.
Dates
- Next results (estimated)
- n/a
- Last annual report (10-K)
- 6 March 2026
- Next quarterly (estimated, 10-Q)
- 9 November 2026
Who owns it
2 long-term investors we follow own it, unchanged from 2 last quarter. 166 funds in all.
| Fund | Value | Share of that fund | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hotchkis & WileyHotchkis & Wiley team | $15m | <0.1% | Added |
| GAMCO InvestorsMario Gabelli | $240,320 | <0.1% | Cut |
Largest holders overall
- Wellington Management Group LLP$159mAdded
- Fortress Investment Group$85mNew
- Canyon Capital Advisors$75mNew
- BlackRock$73mAdded
- Vanguard Capital Management$51mAdded
- Strategic Value Bank Partners$45mNew
- State Street$37mAdded
- Dimensional Fund Advisors LP$29mAdded
- Geode Capital Management$26mAdded
- Stelac Advisory Services$24m
From 13F filings for the quarter ended 30 June 2026.
Big holders and activists
2 investors own more than 5%.
- Wellington Management Group LLPPassive investorat least 9.3%−1.0 pts(filed with 3 related holders)Since 30 June 2026
- Twin Meadow VHC Trust u/a/d 5/25/2011Passive investorat least 2.3%−1.4 pts(filed with 3 related holders)Since 1 April 2026
- Karen Hale Young Family Irrevocable Trust u/a/d 5/25/2011Passive investorSold down below 5%Since 1 April 2026
- Max Alan Hale Family Irrevocable Trust u/a/d 6/1/2011Passive investorSold down below 5%Since 1 April 2026
- Bay Pond Investors (Bermuda) L.P.Passive investorSold down below 5%Since 30 June 2026
- Bay Pond Partners, L.P.Passive investorSold down below 5%Since 30 June 2026
- Dana Hale Nelson Family Irrevocable Trust u/a/d 5-25-2011Passive investorSold down below 5%Since 1 April 2026
- John J Hale Trust u/a/d 12-1-1996Passive investorSold down below 5%Since 17 March 2026
- Lightyear Capital III, LLCPassive investorSold down below 5%Since 31 March 2025
| Holder | Stake | Since | |
|---|---|---|---|
Wellington Management Group LLP Passive investor | at least 9.3%−1.0 pts (filed with 3 related holders) | 30 June 2026 | |
Twin Meadow VHC Trust u/a/d 5/25/2011 Passive investor | at least 2.3%−1.4 pts (filed with 3 related holders) | 1 April 2026 | |
Karen Hale Young Family Irrevocable Trust u/a/d 5/25/2011 Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 1 April 2026 | |
Max Alan Hale Family Irrevocable Trust u/a/d 6/1/2011 Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 1 April 2026 | |
Bay Pond Investors (Bermuda) L.P. Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 30 June 2026 | |
Bay Pond Partners, L.P. Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 30 June 2026 | |
Dana Hale Nelson Family Irrevocable Trust u/a/d 5-25-2011 Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 1 April 2026 | |
John J Hale Trust u/a/d 12-1-1996 Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 17 March 2026 | |
Lightyear Capital III, LLC Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 31 March 2025 |
From Schedule 13D and 13G filings: anyone owning more than 5% must file one.
What insiders did
In the last 12 months, 1 insider bought $52,920 of shares on the open market.
- MURPHY PETER EDirectorBought
- Date
- 16 March 2026
- Shares
- 1,500
- Price
- $35.28
- Value
- $52,920
| Date | Who | Did | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 March 2026 | MURPHY PETER E Director | Bought | 1,500 | $35.28 | $52,920 |
From Form 4 filings: insiders must report trades in their own company's shares within two days.
Warning signs in its filings
Problems the company itself reported to the SEC, in its own words.
None of the warning signs we check for were found.
We look for five warning signs: doubt it can keep going, weak checks on its own accounts, a notice that its past accounts can't be relied on, a change of auditor, and one customer bringing in a big share of sales. We don't check lawsuits, investigations or debt yet.
We checked the auditor's report, internal controls, restatement notices, auditor changes and big customers in the 10-K filed 6 Mar 2026, plus the 10-Q filed 10 Aug 2026 and 8 later 8-Ks.
A 10-K is the yearly report every US company files with the SEC. An 8-K is a short notice of a big event.
What could go wrong
Cheap for a reason is the question the numbers cannot answer.
Whether the price already reflects the risks is what the deep dive is for.
What changed in the risks this year
Companies must list what could hurt them each year. These are the parts that changed since last year’s report.
The merger agreement may be terminated in accordance with its terms and the merger and other transactions contemplated by the merger agreement may not be completed. If the merger is not completed, we will have incurred substantial expenses without realizing the expected benefits of the merger.
Could happenIf the merger is not completed for any reason, there may be various adverse consequences and we may experience negative reactions from the financial markets and from our customers and employees. Additionally, if the merger agreement is terminated, the market price of our common stock could decline to the extent that the current market prices reflect a market assumption that the merger will be completed. We also could be subject to litigation related to any failure to complete the merger or to proceedings commenced against us to perform our obligations under the merger agreement. If the merger agreement is terminated under certain circumstances, either FirstSun or First Foundation may be required to pay a termination fee of $45,089,000 or $31,390,000, respectively, to the other party.
Read moreCombining FirstSun and First Foundation may be more difficult, costly or time-consuming than expected, and the anticipated benefits and cost savings of the merger and the bank merger may not be realized.
Could happenFirstSun and First Foundation have operated and, until the completion of the merger, must continue to operate, independently. The success of the merger and the bank merger, including anticipated benefits and cost savings, will depend, in part, on our ability to successfully combine and integrate our businesses with First Foundation in a manner that permits growth opportunities and does not materially disrupt the existing customer relations or result in decreased revenues due to loss of customers. In addition, the success of the merger will depend, in part, on the successful execution of the planned balance sheet repositioning strategy which contemplates the sale or disposition of certain assets of First Foundation and pay down or run off certain liabilities of First Foundation as part of the balance sheet repositioning (the “balance sheet repositioning”). Execution of the balance sheet repositioning will inherently be subject to market conditions. There is a risk that such conditions will be less favorable than anticipated when the parties entered into the merger agreement and that the balance sheet repositioning may not have the expected effects on our net interest margin, liquidity, or portfolio positioning for potential changes in interest rates. If we are unable to successfully achieve these objectives, the anticipated benefits of the merger and the bank merger may not be realized fully or at all or may take longer to realize than expected. In addition, the actual cost savings of the merger and the bank merger could be less than anticipated, and integration may result in additional and unforeseen expenses.
Read moreCombining FirstSun and First Foundation may be more difficult, costly or time-consuming than expected, and the anticipated benefits and cost savings of the merger and the bank merger may not be realized.
Could happenFurthermore, the board of directors and executive leadership of the combined companies following the merger will consist of former directors and executive officers from each of FirstSun and First Foundation, as described in the merger agreement. Combining the boards of directors and management teams of each company into a single board and a single management team could require the reconciliation of differing priorities and philosophies.
Read moreWe are subject to environmental, social and governance, or ESG, risks that could adversely affect our reputation, the trading price of our common stock and/or our business, operations, and earnings.
Could happenAny adverse publicity or adverse impact on our reputation in connection with ESG, any shifts in investing priorities among investors, or any loss of business resulting from any of the foregoing, may result in adverse effects on the trading price of our common stock and/or our business, operations and earnings.
Read moreCombining FirstSun and First Foundation may be more difficult, costly or time-consuming than expected, and the anticipated benefits and cost savings of the merger and the bank merger may not be realized.
Could happenAn inability to realize the full extent of the anticipated benefits of the merger, as well as any delays encountered in the integration process and the implementation of the balance sheet repositioning, could have an adverse effect upon the revenues, levels of expenses and operating results of the combined company, which may adversely affect the value of our common stock after the completion of the merger. It is possible that the integration process could result in the loss of key employees, the disruption of either company’s ongoing businesses or inconsistencies in standards, controls, procedures and policies that adversely affect the combined company’s ability to maintain relationships with clients, customers, depositors and employees or to achieve the anticipated benefits and cost savings of the merger and the bank merger. If we experience difficulties with the integration process, the anticipated benefits of the merger and the bank merger may not be realized fully or at all, or may take longer to realize than expected. As with any merger of financial institutions, there also may be business disruptions that cause us and/or First Foundation to lose customers or cause customers to remove their accounts from us and/or First Foundation and move their business to competing financial institutions. Integration efforts between the two companies will also divert management attention and resources. These integration matters could have an adverse effect on each of us and First Foundation during this transition period and for an undetermined period after completion of the merger on the combined company.
Read more
The deep dive
Everything above is arithmetic on public filings. The deep dive reads the last ten years of annual reports, the proxy statements, and the earnings calls, then argues the case the way Buffett, Klarman, and Hohn would, and checks every claim against the source.
- What the business is worth, as a range, and the margin of safety at today’s price
- Prices to start buying, buy, and buy hard
- The three things that would make this a mistake
- Every number footnoted to the filing it came from
Your first deep dive is free.
Not advice. Numbers on this page come from SEC filings and are updated each night; prices are updated again after the US market closes. The five-year figures are rounded.