Invitation Homes
INVH on NYSE. Invitation Homes rents single-family houses to people. Market value $15.4bn.
Price checks use the past 12 months to June 2026. Some use the latest annual report instead, as marked. Quality checks use five annual reports, the latest for the year to December 2025.
Recent profit includes a one-time gain, so we price the company excluding that gain.
Should I look at this?
Worth a closer look
Why it could be worth it
What to watch out for
Nothing stood out in the numbers we check.
This is not advice. Check the numbers below.
For every $100 of what the whole company costs, it produced $6.14 of spare cash in the past 12 months. A savings account pays about $4.
The filings do not give us enough to work this out.
The filings do not give us enough to work this out.
Quality score: 80 of 100. Price score: 64 of 100. Our list needs 70 on quality and 60 on price.
$26.39 a share, 9% above its 1-year low
Over the past year the price has ranged from $24.25 to $30.89.
Dividend: 4.6% a year
Paid every year for at least 5 years
Prices from Tuesday’s close (6 October).
Five years of cash, in billions
| Revenue | |||||
| Revenue | $2.0bn | $2.2bn | $2.4bn | $2.6bn | $2.7bn |
| Operating margin | |||||
| Operating margin | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Debt to equity | |||||
| Debt to equity | 0.82 | 0.76 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.88 |
| Shares outstanding | |||||
| Shares outstanding | 0.61bn | 0.61bn | 0.61bn | 0.61bn | 0.59bn |
Health checks
- Free cash flow positive5 of 5 years
- Accounting looks honest (Beneish)Not enough data
- Financial strength (Piotroski)6 of 7 checks we could run
- Profit backed by cash (accruals)Yes
- Debt0.88× equity
- Revenue growth, five yearsSlow, 8.4% a year
- Buying back its own sharesYes, 3% fewer since 2021
The quarter to June 2026
How the business did, compared with the same quarter a year earlier.
- Sales: $748 million last quarter, up 10% on a year ago.
- Profit: $219 million, up 55% on a year ago.
- Spare cash over the past 12 months: $957 million, up from $867 million.
- 3% fewer shares than a year ago. Each share owns a bit more of the company.
- Debt is $8.5 billion more than cash, up from $8.1 billion a year ago.
- Sales grew on a year ago in each of the last 4 quarters.
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $660m |
| December 2024 | $659m |
| March 2025 | $674m |
| June 2025 | $681m |
| September 2025 | $688m |
| December 2025 | $685m |
| March 2026 | $734m |
| June 2026 | $748m |
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $95m |
| December 2024 | $143m |
| March 2025 | $166m |
| June 2025 | $141m |
| September 2025 | $137m |
| December 2025 | $145m |
| March 2026 | $161m |
| June 2026 | $219m |
From the company's quarterly reports to the SEC.
Dates
- Next results (estimated)
- 28 October 2026
- Last annual report (10-K)
- 19 February 2026
- Next quarterly (estimated, 10-Q)
- 29 October 2026
Who owns it
4 long-term investors we follow own it, down from 5 last quarter. 624 funds in all.
- Boston PartnersBoston Partners team
- Value
- $968,500
- Share of fund
- <0.1%
| Fund | Value | Share of that fund | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Land & BuildingsJonathan Litt | $42m | 7.3% | Cut |
| Gotham Asset ManagementJoel Greenblatt | $29m | <0.1% | Added |
| Diamond Hill Capital ManagementRic Dillon (founder) | $18m | 0.1% | Cut |
| Boston PartnersBoston Partners team | $968,500 | <0.1% |
Sold out this quarter
- Voss CapitalTravis CockeSold out
Largest holders overall
- BlackRock$1.9bnCut
- Norges Bank$1.6bnNew
- Vanguard Portfolio Management$1.5bnCut
- State Street$1.2bnCut
- Vanguard Capital Management$1.1bn
- Cohen & Steers$1.1bnAdded
- FMR$525mCut
- Geode Capital Management$515m
- APG Asset Management US$485m
- Invesco$453mAdded
From 13F filings for the quarter ended 30 June 2026.
Big holders and activists
3 investors own more than 5%.
- Vanguard Portfolio ManagementPassive investor8.3%Since 31 March 2026
- Vanguard Capital ManagementPassive investor7.2%Since 31 March 2026
- Cohen & Steers, Inc.Passive investorat least 6.0%−3.4 pts(filed with 4 related holders)Since 31 March 2026
- The Vanguard GroupPassive investorSold down below 5%Since 13 March 2026
| Holder | Stake | Since | |
|---|---|---|---|
Vanguard Portfolio Management Passive investor | 8.3% | 31 March 2026 | |
Vanguard Capital Management Passive investor | 7.2% | 31 March 2026 | |
Cohen & Steers, Inc. Passive investor | at least 6.0%−3.4 pts (filed with 4 related holders) | 31 March 2026 | |
The Vanguard Group Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 13 March 2026 |
From Schedule 13D and 13G filings: anyone owning more than 5% must file one.
What insiders did
No insider bought or sold on the open market in the last 12 months.
From Form 4 filings: insiders must report trades in their own company's shares within two days.
Warning signs in its filings
Problems the company itself reported to the SEC, in its own words.
None of the warning signs we check for were found.
We look for five warning signs: doubt it can keep going, weak checks on its own accounts, a notice that its past accounts can't be relied on, a change of auditor, and one customer bringing in a big share of sales. We don't check lawsuits, investigations or debt yet.
We checked the auditor's report, internal controls, restatement notices, auditor changes and big customers in the 10-K filed 19 Feb 2026, plus the 10-Q filed 30 Jul 2026 and 9 later 8-Ks.
A 10-K is the yearly report every US company files with the SEC. An 8-K is a short notice of a big event.
What could go wrong
Cheap for a reason is the question the numbers cannot answer.
Whether the price already reflects the risks is what the deep dive is for.
What changed in the risks this year
Companies must list what could hurt them each year. These are the parts that changed since last year’s report.
Our reliance on a limited number of third-party digital marketing and lead-generation platforms, including a single dominant platform, exposes us to significant business, financial, and operational risk.
Could happenOur reliance on this platform subjects us to risks largely outside of our control, including changes in pricing, algorithms, listing prioritization, data access, advertising formats, contractual terms, or policies governing the display or distribution of our listings. Any adverse changes to these factors could reduce lead volume or quality, increase our marketing and customer acquisition costs, or impair our ability to convert prospects into residents, any of which could materially and adversely affect our operating results and cash flows.
Read moreOur reliance on a limited number of third-party digital marketing and lead-generation platforms, including a single dominant platform, exposes us to significant business, financial, and operational risk.
Could happenWhile we seek to diversify our marketing channels and invest in alternative lead-generation strategies, there can be no assurance that we will be able to do so effectively or on commercially reasonable terms, or that alternative channels would generate comparable lead volume or efficiency. If our relationship with this platform were terminated, materially altered, or became significantly more costly or less effective, we may not be able to replace the lost leads in a timely or cost-effective manner, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, and ability to execute our growth strategy.
Read moreExecutive actions and proposed federal and state legislation or regulations aimed at limiting institutional ownership and acquisition of single-family homes could materially adversely affect our business, growth strategy, and results of operations.
Could happenFederal, state, and local policymakers have increasingly focused on housing supply and availability, including scrutiny of institutional ownership of single-family residential properties. Recent executive actions and policy initiatives reflect increased federal and state focus on this area and direct the development of legislative, regulatory, or executive measures on the federal and state levels that could restrict, discourage, or prohibit large institutional investors from acquiring or owning single-family homes or financing the acquisition or the operation of single-family homes with federal or government-sponsored enterprises and impose additional reporting obligations, financing limitations, or operational restrictions. These actions and initiatives include a recent executive order directing federal agencies and government-sponsored enterprises to define the attributes of an “institutional investor” (potentially including attributes that we are likely to exhibit) and to take actions that could limit or condition institutional participation in the acquisition or financing of certain single-family homes (with potential narrowly-tailored exceptions for single-family homes developed or acquired through build-to-rent channels), restrict the use of federal or government-sponsored funds to finance such single-family home acquisitions or operations, increase disclosure and compliance requirements, and subject institutional ownership, acquisition, and operating practices for local single-family rental markets to enhanced regulatory review. The administration has also indicated its intent to pursue legislation that could codify or expand such measures.
Read moreOur developer lending program exposes us to additional credit, construction, operational, and valuation risks that could adversely affect our financial condition, cash flows, and operating results .
Could happenWe have launched a developer lending program pursuant to which we provide financing to experienced homebuilders for the development of single-family rental communities that may serve as future acquisition opportunities. Construction and development lending subjects us to risks that differ from those associated with our traditional acquisition activities, including the risk that borrowers may be unable to complete projects on schedule or within budget, experience financial distress, or default on their obligations. We are dependent on the financial strength, operational capacity, and performance of third-party developers, and our exposure may be concentrated among a limited number of borrowers, amplifying these risks.
Read moreOur expansion into land development and home construction activities exposes us to additional operational and real estate risks, which may adversely affect our financial condition, cash flows, and operating results.
Could happenAlthough the ResiBuilt acquisition includes options to acquire approximately 1,500 lots, no land was acquired in the transaction, and there can be no assurance that we will exercise these options on favorable terms, if at all. The availability, timing, and economics of future lot acquisitions remain subject to market conditions, entitlement risk, competition with other homebuilders and land buyers, inflation in land prices, zoning and density restrictions, and other regulatory approvals, many of which are outside of our control. If we are unable to secure suitable lots at acceptable prices, exercise lot options on favorable terms, or experience delays in land acquisition or development, the number of homes we are able to construct and lease, or the scale of our development activities, could be limited, which could adversely affect our growth, financial condition, cash flows, and results of operations.
Read more
The deep dive
Everything above is arithmetic on public filings. The deep dive reads the last ten years of annual reports, the proxy statements, and the earnings calls, then argues the case the way Buffett, Klarman, and Hohn would, and checks every claim against the source.
- What the business is worth, as a range, and the margin of safety at today’s price
- Prices to start buying, buy, and buy hard
- The three things that would make this a mistake
- Every number footnoted to the filing it came from
Your first deep dive is free.
Not advice. Numbers on this page come from SEC filings and are updated each night; prices are updated again after the US market closes. The five-year figures are rounded.