Jack Henry & Associates
JKHY on Nasdaq. Jack Henry sells banking software to community banks and credit unions. Market value $10.2bn.
Price checks use the past 12 months to June 2026. Quality checks use five annual reports, the latest for the year to June 2026.
Should I look at this?
Worth a closer look
Why it could be worth it
What to watch out for
Nothing stood out in the numbers we check.
This is not advice. Check the numbers below.
For every $100 of what the whole company costs, it produced $5.04 of spare cash in the past 12 months. A savings account pays about $4.
You pay 16.0 years of operating profit for the business. The average large US company costs around 18.
Each dollar kept in the business earns 22 cents a year. Above 10 is good.
Quality score: 100 of 100. Price score: 81 of 100. Our list needs 70 on quality and 60 on price.
$144.43 a share, 19% above its 1-year low
Over the past year the price has ranged from $121.04 to $193.39.
Dividend: 1.7% a year
Paid every year for at least 5 years
Prices from Tuesday’s close (6 October).
Five years of cash, in billions
| Revenue | |||||
| Revenue | $1.9bn | $2.1bn | $2.2bn | $2.4bn | $2.5bn |
| Operating margin | |||||
| Operating margin | 24.4% | 23.1% | 22.1% | 23.9% | 25.0% |
| Debt to equity | |||||
| Debt to equity | 0.08 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| Shares outstanding | |||||
| Shares outstanding | 0.07bn | 0.07bn | 0.07bn | 0.07bn | 0.07bn |
Health checks
- Free cash flow positive5 of 5 years
- Accounting looks honest (Beneish)Nothing unusual
- Financial strength (Piotroski)6 of 8 checks we could run
- Profit backed by cash (accruals)Yes
- Debt0.02× equity
- Revenue growth, five yearsSlow, 7.7% a year
- Buying back its own sharesYes, 4% fewer since 2022
The quarter to June 2026
How the business did, compared with the same quarter a year earlier.
- Sales: $644 million last quarter, up 5% on a year ago.
- Profit: $111 million, down 13% on a year ago.
- It keeps 25 cents of each $1 of sales as operating profit, up from 24 cents a year earlier.
- Spare cash over the past 12 months: $511 million, up from $416 million.
- Debt is $28 million more than cash. A year ago it had $102 million more cash than debt.
- Sales grew on a year ago in each of the last 4 quarters.
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $601m |
| December 2024 | $574m |
| March 2025 | $585m |
| June 2025 | $615m |
| September 2025 | $645m |
| December 2025 | $619m |
| March 2026 | $636m |
| June 2026 | $644m |
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $119m |
| December 2024 | $98m |
| March 2025 | $111m |
| June 2025 | $128m |
| September 2025 | $144m |
| December 2025 | $125m |
| March 2026 | $123m |
| June 2026 | $111m |
From the company's quarterly reports to the SEC.
Dates
- Next results (estimated)
- 3 November 2026
- Last annual report (10-K)
- 28 August 2026
- Next quarterly (estimated, 10-Q)
- 6 August 2026
Who owns it
5 long-term investors we follow own it, up from 4 last quarter. 710 funds in all.
- GMOJeremy Grantham
- Value
- $45m
- Share of fund
- 0.1%
| Fund | Value | Share of that fund | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| GMOJeremy Grantham | $45m | 0.1% | |
| Gotham Asset ManagementJoel Greenblatt | $39m | <0.1% | Added |
| Fenimore Asset Management (FAM Funds)John Fox | $28m | 0.6% | Cut |
| Royce & AssociatesChuck Royce | $2m | <0.1% | New |
| Torray Investment PartnersRobert Torray (founder) | $2m | 0.2% | Cut |
Largest holders overall
- Kayne Anderson Rudnick Investment Management$718mCut
- BlackRock$705mCut
- Vanguard Capital Management$640m
- State Street$510mCut
- Vanguard Portfolio Management$490m
- Geode Capital Management$379mAdded
- Morgan Stanley$327mCut
- Arrowstreet Capital, Limited Partnership$290mAdded
- CIBC Bancorp USA$263m
- Invesco$259m
From 13F filings for the quarter ended 30 June 2026.
Big holders and activists
5 investors own more than 5%.
- Kayne Anderson Rudnick Investment Management, LLCPassive investor8.1%+1.6 ptsSince 31 December 2025
- Vanguard Capital ManagementPassive investor7.5%Since 31 March 2026
- BlackRock, Inc.Passive investor6.8%Since 30 June 2026
- Vanguard Portfolio ManagementPassive investor5.0%Since 30 June 2026
- APG Asset Management US Inc.Passive investorat least 3.3%(filed with 3 related holders)Since 31 December 2024
- Morgan StanleyPassive investorSold down below 5%Since 30 September 2025
- The Vanguard GroupPassive investorSold down below 5%Since 13 March 2026
| Holder | Stake | Since | |
|---|---|---|---|
Kayne Anderson Rudnick Investment Management, LLC Passive investor | 8.1%+1.6 pts | 31 December 2025 | |
Vanguard Capital Management Passive investor | 7.5% | 31 March 2026 | |
BlackRock, Inc. Passive investor | 6.8% | 30 June 2026 | |
Vanguard Portfolio Management Passive investor | 5.0% | 30 June 2026 | |
APG Asset Management US Inc. Passive investor | at least 3.3% (filed with 3 related holders) | 31 December 2024 | |
Morgan Stanley Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 30 September 2025 | |
The Vanguard Group Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 13 March 2026 |
From Schedule 13D and 13G filings: anyone owning more than 5% must file one.
What insiders did
In the last 12 months, 2 insiders bought $317,135 of shares on the open market. 2 sold $4m.
- Adelson Gregory R.President & CEO, DirectorBought
- Date
- 14 May 2026
- Shares
- 2,000
- Price
- $133.42
- Value
- $266,840
- Carsley MimiCFO and TreasurerBought
- Date
- 14 May 2026
- Shares
- 375
- Price
- $134.12
- Value
- $50,295
- Foss David BDirectorSold
- Date
- 1 December 2025
- Shares
- 20,000
- Price
- $174.92
- Value
- $3m
- McLachlan Shanon G.COOSold
- Date
- 10 November 2025
- Shares
- 227
- Price
- $160.83
- Value
- $36,508
| Date | Who | Did | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14 May 2026 | Adelson Gregory R. President & CEO, Director | Bought | 2,000 | $133.42 | $266,840 |
| 14 May 2026 | Carsley Mimi CFO and Treasurer | Bought | 375 | $134.12 | $50,295 |
| 1 December 2025 | Foss David B Director | Sold | 20,000 | $174.92 | $3m |
| 10 November 2025 | McLachlan Shanon G. COO | Sold | 227 | $160.83 | $36,508 |
From Form 4 filings: insiders must report trades in their own company's shares within two days.
Warning signs in its filings
Problems the company itself reported to the SEC, in its own words.
None of the warning signs we check for were found.
We look for five warning signs: doubt it can keep going, weak checks on its own accounts, a notice that its past accounts can't be relied on, a change of auditor, and one customer bringing in a big share of sales. We don't check lawsuits, investigations or debt yet.
We checked the auditor's report, internal controls, restatement notices, auditor changes and big customers in the 10-K filed 28 Aug 2026, and no later 8-Ks.
A 10-K is the yearly report every US company files with the SEC. An 8-K is a short notice of a big event.
What could go wrong
Cheap for a reason is the question the numbers cannot answer.
Whether the price already reflects the risks is what the deep dive is for.
What changed in the risks this year
Companies must list what could hurt them each year. These are the parts that changed since last year’s report.
Moreover, the legislative and regulatory landscape continues to evolve to include alternative payment types, including digital and…
Could happenMoreover, the legislative and regulatory landscape continues to evolve to include alternative payment types, including digital and cryptocurrencies. The regulatory environment for crypto assets, stablecoins, and digital currencies is rapidly evolving, with increased oversight from federal and state regulatory agencies. Recent developments, including the GENIUS Act, and other legislative initiatives, bring increased oversight and more robust compliance obligations including consumer protection, anti-money laundering, sanctions compliance, operational resilience and recordkeeping requirements. We closely monitor legislative and regulatory changes to ensure any existing or new business models, product offerings, and risk and compliance programs adapt to new requirements. Any failure to comply with such laws and regulations could expose us to liability, regulatory scrutiny and/or reputational damage. Rapid changes to cryptocurrency laws and regulations could increase the costs and complexity of compliance, including associated recordkeeping costs, or could require us to change our business practices in a timeframe or manner adverse to our business. As we make significant investments in research, development, and marketing for new products in emerging technologies in an uncertain and rapidly changing regulatory landscape, we may not achieve immediate or expected returns.
Read moreWe operate in highly competitive and rapidly evolving markets and our business will be adversely affected if we fail to compete effectively.
Could happenWe operate in highly competitive and rapidly evolving markets and our business will be adversely affected if we fail to compete effectively. We vigorously compete with a variety of software vendors and service providers in all our major product lines. We compete on the basis of product quality, reliability, performance, ease of use, quality of support and services, integration with other products, and pricing. Some of our competitors may have advantages over us due to their size, product lines, greater marketing resources, or exclusive intellectual property rights. New competitors, including smaller start-ups, regularly appear with new products, services, and technology for financial institutions. We are also experiencing increasing competition from nontraditional market participants, including financial technology companies, payment-focused providers, and technology platforms that offer products, services, or alternative delivery models that compete with portions of our solutions. Certain competitors may be able to devote greater financial resources to innovation, respond more rapidly to changing client demands, or accept business and operating risks that differ from our approach. If competitors offer more favorable pricing, payment or other contractual terms, warranties, or functionality, or otherwise attract our clients or prevent us from capturing new clients, we may need to lower prices or offer other terms that negatively impact our results of operations in order to successfully compete. Emerging technologies, evolving payment methods, and changing client preferences may alter how financial services products and services are delivered and consumed and could reduce demand for certain existing solutions or displace portions of traditional technology and payment processing models. If we are unable to adapt our products and services to these developments in a timely and cost-effective manner, our competitive position, revenues, growth prospects, and results of operations could be adversely affected. In addition, increased adoption of specialized point solutions may reduce demand for broader integrated offerings and result in the replacement of components of our existing product suite.
Read moreThe increasing adoption of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and generative artificial intelligence into our products…
Could happenThe increasing adoption of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and generative artificial intelligence into our products introduces significant and evolving risks that could lead to unintended consequences, result in reputational harm, and increased litigation. Our business currently utilizes AI and ML and we continue to evaluate and expand their use, including generative AI, to augment our products and services. While these technologies offer distinct business opportunities, they also bring evolving legal, regulatory, and operational risks. The regulatory landscape relating to these technologies is quickly and constantly evolving and requires significant resources to modify and maintain business practices to comply with applicable laws. Further, the ongoing tension between the states and the federal government regarding AI regulations is causing increased uncertainty and risk and compliance costs, particularly regarding the use of automated decision-making and other uses of AI technologies in high-risk industries, including the financial industry. This uncertainty has a broader impact than simply AI-targeted regulations and may expose us to claims of privacy rights violations or providing inadequate cybersecurity protections. From an operational standpoint, AI algorithms and training methodologies may create accuracy issues, unintended biases, factual errors, misrepresentations, offensive language, inappropriate statements, or other unexpected outcomes that could undermine product and service quality or lead to errors in our decision-making and solution development. Ineffective or inadequate AI development, testing, evaluation, deployment, content labeling, or governance may impair public acceptance or cause harm, resulting in offerings not working as intended, and we also face explainability risk from our potential inability to interpret or justify AI model decisions, which may lead to concerns about trust, regulatory compliance, and accountability. Furthermore, the uncertainty in the regulatory environment and our development and use of generative AI technologies expose us to evolving intellectual property risks, including the potential misuse of proprietary or confidential inputs, infringement of third-party rights, and uncertainty regarding the ownership of AI-generated outputs. Additionally, the use of AI tools by associates—whether authorized or not—for internal functions or business operations may result in unintended or unreliable outputs, which could negatively impact the quality, accuracy, or consistency of work product and decision-making. Our failure to accurately identify and address our responsibilities and liabilities in this new environment could negatively affect any solutions we develop incorporating such technology and could subject us to reputational harm, regulatory action, or litigation, which may harm our financial condition and operating results. These same risks apply to our third-party service providers who are implementing these tools into the products or services they provide to us. Any failures to manage and mitigate these risks by these third-party service providers may negatively affect the products and services we provide our clients.
Read more
The deep dive
Everything above is arithmetic on public filings. The deep dive reads the last ten years of annual reports, the proxy statements, and the earnings calls, then argues the case the way Buffett, Klarman, and Hohn would, and checks every claim against the source.
- What the business is worth, as a range, and the margin of safety at today’s price
- Prices to start buying, buy, and buy hard
- The three things that would make this a mistake
- Every number footnoted to the filing it came from
Your first deep dive is free.
Not advice. Numbers on this page come from SEC filings and are updated each night; prices are updated again after the US market closes. The five-year figures are rounded.