Grand Canyon Education

LOPE on Nasdaq. Grand Canyon Education sells education services to colleges and universities. Market value $3.1bn.

Watch this stockFree. We tell you when something changes.

Price checks use the past 12 months to September 2026. Quality checks use five annual reports, the latest for the year to December 2025.

We can't read total debt from the filing, so debt is left out.

Should I look at this?

Worth a closer look

Read what could go wrong

This is not advice. Check the numbers below.

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Cash yield
past 12 months to September 2026
9.6%high

For every $100 of what the whole company costs, it produced $9.60 of spare cash in the past 12 months. A savings account pays about $4.

Price to profit
past 12 months to September 2026
n/a

The filings do not give us enough to work this out.

Return on capital
five annual reports to December 2025
n/a

The filings do not give us enough to work this out.

Quality score: 80 of 100. Price score: 83 of 100. Our list needs 70 on quality and 60 on price.

$108.13 a share, at its 1-year low

Over the past year the price has ranged from $107.97 to $182.16.

Pays no dividend

Prices from Friday’s close (20 November).

Five years of cash, in billions

0.3
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3
2021202220232024202512 monthsto Sep '26
Revenue
$897m$911m$961m$1.0bn$1.1bn
Operating margin
31.5%26.1%25.9%26.7%24.0%
Debt to equity
n/an/an/an/an/a
Shares outstanding
0.03bn0.03bn0.03bn0.03bn0.03bn

Health checks

  • Free cash flow positive5 of 5 years
  • Accounting looks honest (Beneish)Not enough data
  • Financial strength (Piotroski)6 of 7 checks we could run
  • Profit backed by cash (accruals)Yes
  • DebtUnknown
  • Revenue growth, five yearsSlow, 5.6% a year
  • Buying back its own sharesYes, 18% fewer since 2021

The quarter to September 2026

How the business did, compared with the same quarter a year earlier.

  • Sales: $267 million last quarter, up 2% on a year ago.
  • Profit: $43 million, up 164% on a year ago.
  • It keeps 27 cents of each $1 of sales as operating profit, up from 24 cents a year earlier.
  • Spare cash over the past 12 months: $265 million, up from $242 million.
  • 8% fewer shares than a year ago. Each share owns a bit more of the company.
  • Sales grew on a year ago in each of the last 4 quarters.
Sales by quarter
Sales by quarter
Quarter toAmount
December 2024$293m
March 2025$289m
June 2025$247m
September 2025$261m
December 2025$308m
March 2026$309m
June 2026$264m
September 2026$267m
Profit by quarter
Profit by quarter
Quarter toAmount
December 2024$82m
March 2025$72m
June 2025$42m
September 2025$16m
December 2025$87m
March 2026$75m
June 2026$46m
September 2026$43m

From the company's quarterly reports to the SEC.

Dates

Next results (estimated)
n/a
Last annual report (10-K)
18 February 2026
Next quarterly (estimated, 10-Q)
3 February 2027

Who owns it

4 long-term investors we follow own it, down from 5 last quarter. 445 funds in all.

Jun '25
Dec '25
Jun '26
Largest holders overall

From 13F filings for the quarter ended 30 June 2026.

Big holders and activists

3 investors own more than 5%.

From Schedule 13D and 13G filings: anyone owning more than 5% must file one.

What insiders did

No insider bought or sold on the open market in the last 12 months.

From Form 4 filings: insiders must report trades in their own company's shares within two days.

How the boss is paid

The boss was paid $2 million in 2025, about 33 times the typical employee’s pay.

  • The yearly bonus pays for per-share results:

    No — it uses sales and profit targets. See it in the filing

  • The long-term stock award pays for per-share results:

    We couldn’t tell from the filing.

Why it matters: new shares can grow total profit while each share earns less. Per-share goals pay the boss only when your slice grows.

From the proxy statement (the company’s yearly voting pack) filed 23 April 2026. Picked out automatically from the company’s own filing. Evidence, not our verdict.

Warning signs in its filings

Problems the company itself reported to the SEC, in its own words.

None of the serious warning signs we check for were found. 1 thing worth knowing.

We look for five warning signs: doubt it can keep going, weak checks on its own accounts, a notice that its past accounts can't be relied on, a change of auditor, and one customer bringing in a big share of sales. We don't check lawsuits, investigations or debt yet.

We checked the auditor's report, internal controls, restatement notices, auditor changes and big customers in the 10-K filed 18 Feb 2026, plus the 10-Q filed 4 Nov 2026 and 8 later 8-Ks.

  • One big customer

    Worth knowing

    One customer brings in a big share of sales: 89.5% last year. Losing that customer would hurt.

    “Our dependence on our most significant university partner, with 89.5% and 88.9% of total service revenue for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively, subjects us to the risk that declines in our customers’ operations would result in a sustained reduction in service revenue for the Company.”

    From the 10-K filed 18 February 2026, Item 8. Financial Statements and Notes. Read it in the filing

A 10-K is the yearly report every US company files with the SEC. An 8-K is a short notice of a big event.

What could go wrong

Cheap for a reason is the question the numbers cannot answer.

Whether the price already reflects the risks is what the deep dive is for.

What changed in the risks this year

Companies must list what could hurt them each year. These are the parts that changed since last year’s report.

  • Risks Related to the Extensive Regulation of the Higher Education Industry

    Could happen
    On July 4, 2025, President Trump signed the OBBBA, which makes a variety of changes to federal student aid programs, including loan limits, accountability measures for programs based on low earning outcomes, loan repayment, Pell Grant eligibility, and regulatory changes. As one example, OBBBA creates the “Do No Harm” accountability framework, effective July 2026, that institutions must satisfy at the program level in order for students to continue to receive Federal Direct Loans for such programs. Under this framework, OBBBA requires that an undergraduate program become ineligible for Federal Direct Loans if, in two out of three consecutive years, the median earnings of a cohort of program completers are less than the median earnings of working adults aged 25-34 with only a high school diploma, either in the state where the institution is located or, if fewer than 50% of students at the institution reside in the institution’s state, the national average. OBBBA requires that a graduate or professional program become ineligible for Federal Direct Loans if, in two out of three consecutive years, the median earnings of a cohort of program completers are less than the median earnings of working adults aged 25–34 with only a bachelor’s degree. Both the undergraduate and graduate/professional accountability provisions apply to the cohort of students who completed the program four years prior, are working, are not enrolled at any institution, and who received Federal Direct Loan funds for enrollment in the program. If a cohort is less than 30 students, the Secretary of Education may aggregate additional years of programmatic data. Based on data provided by the ED for students that graduated in 2015-2016, all of the programs that we provide services to our university partners passed this metric except GCU’s Masters in Mental and Social Health programs. GCU is currently analyzing the data related to these programs and it appears that most universities that provide these programs online to working adult students fail this metric. To the extent that these or any other programs offered by our university partners pursuant to our services agreements fail these metrics, then this would have an adverse effect on our university partners and thus an adverse effect on our business. We cannot predict with certainty how all of these regulatory requirements under the OBBBA will be applied or what their ultimate impact on our business will be.
    Read more
  • Our success depends upon our ability and our university partners’ ability to recruit and retain key personnel.

    Could happen
    In addition, our university partners heavily rely on their ability to attract and retain qualified faculty members to effectively educate their students. If our university partners fail to retain sufficient numbers of qualified faculty members, fail to adequately train new faculty members, or allow relations with faculty members to deteriorate, they may be required to reduce the number or scope of classes available to students, which could in turn have a material adverse impact on our business.
    Read more

Read it in the annual report

The deep dive

Everything above is arithmetic on public filings. The deep dive reads the last ten years of annual reports, the proxy statements, and the earnings calls, then argues the case the way Buffett, Klarman, and Hohn would, and checks every claim against the source.

  • What the business is worth, as a range, and the margin of safety at today’s price
  • Prices to start buying, buy, and buy hard
  • The three things that would make this a mistake
  • Every number footnoted to the filing it came from
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What a finished deep dive looks like

Not advice. Numbers on this page come from SEC filings and are updated each night; prices are updated again after the US market closes. The five-year figures are rounded.