MainStreet Bancshares
MNSB on Nasdaq. MainStreet Bancshares sells banking services to individuals and businesses. Market value $177m.
Price checks use the past 12 months to June 2026. Some use the latest annual report instead, as marked. Quality checks use five annual reports, the latest for the year to December 2025.
Should I look at this?
Worth a closer look
Why it could be worth it
What to watch out for
Nothing stood out in the numbers we check.
This is not advice. Check the numbers below.
Yearly profit per dollar of owners' money: 12 cents. Above 10 is good.
What you pay for each dollar of net assets: $0.83.
Profit per $100 you pay: $9.79.
Quality score: 80 of 100. Price score: 100 of 100. Our list needs 70 on quality and 60 on price.
$24.86 a share, 39% above its 1-year low
Over the past year the price has ranged from $17.86 to $25.87.
Dividend: 1.7% a year
Paid every year for 4 years
Prices from Tuesday’s close (6 October).
Five years of cash, in billions
| Revenue | |||||
| Revenue | $2m | $89m | $128m | $138m | $136m |
| Operating margin | |||||
| Operating margin | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Debt to equity | |||||
| Debt to equity | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Shares outstanding | |||||
| Shares outstanding | 0.01bn | 0.01bn | 0.01bn | 0.01bn | 0.01bn |
Health checks
- Free cash flow positiveDoesn't apply to banks and insurers
- Accounting checksDoesn't apply to banks and insurers
- DebtDoesn't apply to banks and insurers
- Revenue growth, five yearsStrong, 173.4% a year
- Buying back its own sharesYes, 4% fewer since 2021
The quarter to June 2026
How the business did, compared with the same quarter a year earlier.
- Sales: $552,000 last quarter, down 98% on a year ago.
- Profit: $5 million, about the same as a year ago.
- Spare cash over the past 12 months: $23 million, up from $6 million.
- Sales did not grow on a year ago in any of the last 4 quarters.
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $34m |
| December 2024 | $36m |
| March 2025 | $34m |
| June 2025 | $35m |
| September 2025 | $34m |
| December 2025 | $33m |
| March 2026 | $573,000 |
| June 2026 | $552,000 |
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $265,000 |
| December 2024 | -$16m |
| March 2025 | $2m |
| June 2025 | $5m |
| September 2025 | $5m |
| December 2025 | $4m |
| March 2026 | $4m |
| June 2026 | $5m |
From the company's quarterly reports to the SEC.
Dates
- Next results (estimated)
- n/a
- Last annual report (10-K)
- 13 March 2026
- Next quarterly (estimated, 10-Q)
- 6 November 2026
Who owns it
1 long-term investor we follow owns it, unchanged from 1 last quarter. 97 funds in all.
| Fund | Value | Share of that fund | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Manhattan Co.First Manhattan partners | $4m | <0.1% | Cut |
Largest holders overall
- Banc Funds$13mAdded
- BlackRock$10mAdded
- Alliancebernstein L.P.$9mCut
- Wellington Management Group LLP$8mCut
- Vanguard Capital Management$6mCut
- Dimensional Fund Advisors LP$5mAdded
- Acadian Asset Management$5mAdded
- First Manhattan Co.$4mCut
- Geode Capital Management$4mAdded
- Marshall Wace, LLP$3mAdded
From 13F filings for the quarter ended 30 June 2026.
Big holders and activists
5 investors own more than 5%.
- AllianceBernstein L.P.Passive investor5.9%−1.6 ptsSince 30 June 2026
- BlackRock, Inc.Passive investor5.6%Since 30 June 2026
- Banc Fund X L.P.Passive investorat least 5.6%(filed with 3 related holders)Since 31 December 2025
- MainStreet Bank 401(k) Retirement PlanPassive investor5.1%Since 31 December 2025
- Wellington Management Group LLPPassive investorat least 4.7%(filed with 2 related holders)Since 31 December 2025
- Fourthstone LLCPassive investorSold down below 5%Since 30 June 2026
| Holder | Stake | Since | |
|---|---|---|---|
AllianceBernstein L.P. Passive investor | 5.9%−1.6 pts | 30 June 2026 | |
BlackRock, Inc. Passive investor | 5.6% | 30 June 2026 | |
Banc Fund X L.P. Passive investor | at least 5.6% (filed with 3 related holders) | 31 December 2025 | |
MainStreet Bank 401(k) Retirement Plan Passive investor | 5.1% | 31 December 2025 | |
Wellington Management Group LLP Passive investor | at least 4.7% (filed with 2 related holders) | 31 December 2025 | |
Fourthstone LLC Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 30 June 2026 |
From Schedule 13D and 13G filings: anyone owning more than 5% must file one.
What insiders did
In the last 12 months, 2 insiders bought $16,126 of shares on the open market. 2 sold $913,409.
- Vari Richard AlexanderChief Financial OfficerSold
- Date
- 4 June 2026
- Shares
- 4,500
- Price
- $23.20
- Value
- $104,400
- CHMELIK THOMAS JCFO, MainStreet Bancshares Inc, DirectorSold
- Date
- 9 December 2025
- Shares
- 7,238
- Price
- $20.09
- Value
- $145,408
- CHMELIK THOMAS JCFO, MainStreet Bancshares Inc, DirectorSold
- Date
- 8 December 2025
- Shares
- 23,577
- Price
- $19.93
- Value
- $469,928
- CHMELIK THOMAS JCFO, MainStreet Bancshares Inc, DirectorSold
- Date
- 3 December 2025
- Shares
- 9,771
- Price
- $19.82
- Value
- $193,674
- Brockett Charles C.DirectorBought
- Date
- 24 November 2025
- Shares
- 742
- Price
- $19.02
- Value
- $14,113
- DICK JEFF WChairman, President and CEO, DirectorBought
- Date
- 24 November 2025
- Shares
- 106
- Price
- $18.99
- Value
- $2,013
| Date | Who | Did | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 June 2026 | Vari Richard Alexander Chief Financial Officer | Sold | 4,500 | $23.20 | $104,400 |
| 9 December 2025 | CHMELIK THOMAS J CFO, MainStreet Bancshares Inc, Director | Sold | 7,238 | $20.09 | $145,408 |
| 8 December 2025 | CHMELIK THOMAS J CFO, MainStreet Bancshares Inc, Director | Sold | 23,577 | $19.93 | $469,928 |
| 3 December 2025 | CHMELIK THOMAS J CFO, MainStreet Bancshares Inc, Director | Sold | 9,771 | $19.82 | $193,674 |
| 24 November 2025 | Brockett Charles C. Director | Bought | 742 | $19.02 | $14,113 |
| 24 November 2025 | DICK JEFF W Chairman, President and CEO, Director | Bought | 106 | $18.99 | $2,013 |
From Form 4 filings: insiders must report trades in their own company's shares within two days.
Warning signs in its filings
Problems the company itself reported to the SEC, in its own words.
None of the warning signs we check for were found.
We look for five warning signs: doubt it can keep going, weak checks on its own accounts, a notice that its past accounts can't be relied on, a change of auditor, and one customer bringing in a big share of sales. We don't check lawsuits, investigations or debt yet.
We checked the auditor's report, internal controls, restatement notices, auditor changes and big customers in the 10-K filed 13 Mar 2026, plus the 10-Q filed 7 Aug 2026 and 12 later 8-Ks.
A 10-K is the yearly report every US company files with the SEC. An 8-K is a short notice of a big event.
What could go wrong
Cheap for a reason is the question the numbers cannot answer.
Whether the price already reflects the risks is what the deep dive is for.
What changed in the risks this year
Companies must list what could hurt them each year. These are the parts that changed since last year’s report.
The adoption and use of artificial intelligence tools by us and our third-party vendors and service providers may increase the risk of errors, omissions, unfair treatment or fraudulent behavior by our employees, clients, or counterparties, or other third parties.
Could happenIn addition, regulation of AI is rapidly evolving as legislatures and regulators are increasingly focused on these powerful emerging technologies. The technologies underlying AI and its uses are subject to a variety of laws and regulations, including intellectual property, data privacy and cybersecurity, consumer protection, competition, equal opportunity, and fair lending laws, and are expected to be subject to increased regulation and new laws or new applications of existing laws and regulations. AI is the subject of ongoing review by various U.S. governmental and regulatory agencies, and various U.S. states are applying, or are considering applying, existing laws and regulations to AI or are considering general legal frameworks for AI. We may not be able to anticipate how to respond to these rapidly evolving frameworks, and we may need to expend resources to adjust our operations or offerings in certain jurisdictions if the legal frameworks are inconsistent across jurisdictions. Furthermore, because AI technology itself is highly complex and rapidly developing, it is not possible to predict all the legal, operational or technological risks that may arise relating to the use of AI. Our use of AI may require additional resources, including the incurrence of additional costs, to develop and maintain our products and services to minimize potentially harmful or unintended consequences, to comply with applicable and emerging laws and regulations, to maintain or extend our competitive position, and to address any ethical, reputational, technical, operational, legal, competitive or regulatory issues which may arise as a result of any of the foregoing.
Read moreThe adoption and use of artificial intelligence tools by us and our third-party vendors and service providers may increase the risk of errors, omissions, unfair treatment or fraudulent behavior by our employees, clients, or counterparties, or other third parties.
Could happenOur adoption and use of artificial intelligence, including generative artificial intelligence, machine learning, and similar tools and technologies that collect, aggregate, analyze or generate data or other materials or content (collectively, "AI"), for internal use has increased our efficiency, and we expect to continue to adopt such tools as appropriate, in line with our AI Strategy. In addition, we expect our third-party vendors and service providers to increasingly develop and incorporate AI into their product offerings faster than we are able to do so independently. The adoption and incorporation of such AI tools can lead to concerns around safety and soundness, fair access to financial services, fair treatment of consumers, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. We have implemented an AI governance function and risk management framework that includes a risk assessment of internal and vendor AI solutions, due diligence, and controls.
Read moreOur stress tests may not accurately predict our financial condition.
Could happenWe perform credit and capital stress testing on an quarterly basis using stress test assumptions we believe are reasonable. Within our stress test, we estimate our credit losses, resources available to absorb those losses, and any necessary additions to capital. The results of these stress tests involve many assumptions about the future economy, credit losses and default rates and may not accurately reflect our financial condition. Any deterioration in the economy could result in significantly higher credit losses and negative impacts on our financial condition and capital than projected by our internal stress tests.
Read more
The deep dive
Everything above is arithmetic on public filings. The deep dive reads the last ten years of annual reports, the proxy statements, and the earnings calls, then argues the case the way Buffett, Klarman, and Hohn would, and checks every claim against the source.
- What the business is worth, as a range, and the margin of safety at today’s price
- Prices to start buying, buy, and buy hard
- The three things that would make this a mistake
- Every number footnoted to the filing it came from
Your first deep dive is free.
Not advice. Numbers on this page come from SEC filings and are updated each night; prices are updated again after the US market closes. The five-year figures are rounded.