Tidewater
TDW on NYSE. Tidewater provides offshore service vessels to the global offshore energy industry. Market value $4.2bn.
Price checks use the past 12 months to June 2026. Quality checks use five annual reports, the latest for the year to December 2025.
Capital spending looks too small to be complete, so we leave free cash flow out.
Should I look at this?
Worth a closer look
Why it could be worth it
What to watch out for
Nothing stood out in the numbers we check.
This is not advice. Check the numbers below.
For every $100 of what the whole company costs, it produced $6.49 of spare cash in the past 12 months. A savings account pays about $4.
You pay 17.0 years of operating profit for the business. The average large US company costs around 18.
Each dollar kept in the business earns 10 cents a year. Above 10 is good.
Quality score: 82 of 100. Price score: 90 of 100. Our list needs 70 on quality and 60 on price.
$83.93 a share, 80% above its 1-year low
Over the past year the price has ranged from $46.65 to $101.58.
Pays no dividend
Prices from Monday’s close (5 October).
Five years of cash, in billions
| Revenue | |||||
| Revenue | $371m | $648m | $1.0bn | $1.3bn | $1.4bn |
| Operating margin | |||||
| Operating margin | -25.6% | 4.1% | 18.0% | 23.1% | 20.9% |
| Debt to equity | |||||
| Debt to equity | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.71 | 0.58 | 0.51 |
| Shares outstanding | |||||
| Shares outstanding | 0.05bn | 0.05bn | 0.05bn | 0.05bn | 0.05bn |
Health checks
- Free cash flow positive1 of 1 years
- Accounting looks honest (Beneish)Not enough data
- Financial strength (Piotroski)6 of 8 checks we could run
- Profit backed by cash (accruals)Yes
- Debt0.51× equity
- Revenue growth, five yearsStrong, 27.8% a year
- Buying back its own sharesNo, 7% more shares since 2021
The quarter to June 2026
How the business did, compared with the same quarter a year earlier.
- Sales: $342 million last quarter, about the same as a year ago.
- Profit: $22 million, down 70% on a year ago.
- It keeps 18 cents of each $1 of sales as operating profit, down from 23 cents a year earlier.
- About the same number of shares as a year ago.
- Debt is $40 million more than cash, down from $256 million a year ago.
- Sales grew on a year ago in 2 of the last 4 quarters.
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $340m |
| December 2024 | $345m |
| March 2025 | $333m |
| June 2025 | $341m |
| September 2025 | $341m |
| December 2025 | $337m |
| March 2026 | $326m |
| June 2026 | $342m |
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $46m |
| December 2024 | $37m |
| March 2025 | $43m |
| June 2025 | $73m |
| September 2025 | -$806,000 |
| December 2025 | $220m |
| March 2026 | $6m |
| June 2026 | $22m |
From the company's quarterly reports to the SEC.
Dates
- Next results (estimated)
- n/a
- Last annual report (10-K)
- 2 March 2026
- Next quarterly (estimated, 10-Q)
- 2 November 2026
Who owns it
14 long-term investors we follow own it, unchanged from 14 last quarter. 362 funds in all.
- Third Avenue ManagementMatthew Fine
- Value
- $62m
- Share of fund
- 10.0%
- Aegis FinancialScott Barbee
- Value
- $18m
- Share of fund
- 2.9%
- Royce & AssociatesChuck Royce
- Value
- $2m
- Share of fund
- <0.1%
- LSV Asset ManagementJosef Lakonishok
- Value
- $100,000
- Share of fund
- <0.1%
| Fund | Value | Share of that fund | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Third Avenue ManagementMatthew Fine | $62m | 10.0% | |
| Hosking PartnersJeremy Hosking | $41m | 1.4% | Cut |
| Boston PartnersBoston Partners team | $28m | <0.1% | Cut |
| ValueWorksCharles Lemonides | $20m | 4.1% | Cut |
| Aegis FinancialScott Barbee | $18m | 2.9% | |
| First Manhattan Co.First Manhattan partners | $7m | <0.1% | Added |
| Moerus Capital ManagementAmit Wadhwaney | $5m | 2.4% | Cut |
| First Pacific Advisors (FPA)Steven Romick | $5m | <0.1% | Cut |
| Hotchkis & WileyHotchkis & Wiley team | $4m | <0.1% | Cut |
| Tweedy, BrowneTweedy Browne partners | $2m | 0.1% | Added |
| Royce & AssociatesChuck Royce | $2m | <0.1% | |
| Gotham Asset ManagementJoel Greenblatt | $1m | <0.1% | Cut |
| GAMCO InvestorsMario Gabelli | $311,828 | <0.1% | Cut |
| LSV Asset ManagementJosef Lakonishok | $100,000 | <0.1% |
Largest holders overall
- BlackRock$503mAdded
- Price T Rowe Associates$245mAdded
- Robotti Robert$194m
- Neuberger Berman Group$187mCut
- Vanguard Portfolio Management$184mAdded
- Dimensional Fund Advisors LP$139mAdded
- State Street$135mAdded
- Vanguard Capital Management$130m
- Baillie Gifford$111mAdded
- American Century Companies$108mAdded
From 13F filings for the quarter ended 30 June 2026.
Big holders and activists
6 investors own more than 5%.
- BlackRock, Inc.Passive investor13.6%Since 31 December 2024
- T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.Passive investor6.5%−2.4 ptsSince 31 March 2026
- Neuberger Berman Group LLCPassive investorat least 5.8%(filed with 1 related holder)Since 31 December 2024
- Vanguard Portfolio ManagementPassive investor5.4%Since 31 March 2026
- at least 5.0%(filed with 8 related holders)Since 13 December 2024
What they said
Mr. Robotti serves on the Board of Directors of the Issuer and on the Compensation and Human Capital Committee and the Nominating and Governance of the Board of Directors. The Reporting Persons are long-term, buy-and-hold investors. Depending on various factors including,…
Read the filing - FMR LLCPassive investorat least 4.7%(filed with 1 related holder)Since 31 December 2024
- The Vanguard GroupPassive investorSold down below 5%Since 13 March 2026
| Holder | Stake | Since | |
|---|---|---|---|
BlackRock, Inc. Passive investor | 13.6% | 31 December 2024 | |
T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. Passive investor | 6.5%−2.4 pts | 31 March 2026 | |
Neuberger Berman Group LLC Passive investor | at least 5.8% (filed with 1 related holder) | 31 December 2024 | |
Vanguard Portfolio Management Passive investor | 5.4% | 31 March 2026 | |
at least 5.0% (filed with 8 related holders) | 13 December 2024 | What they saidMr. Robotti serves on the Board of Directors of the Issuer and on the Compensation and Human Capital Committee and the Nominating and Governance of the Board of Directors. The Reporting Persons are long-term, buy-and-hold investors. Depending on various factors including,… Read the filing | |
FMR LLC Passive investor | at least 4.7% (filed with 1 related holder) | 31 December 2024 | |
The Vanguard Group Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 13 March 2026 |
From Schedule 13D and 13G filings: anyone owning more than 5% must file one.
What insiders did
No insider bought shares on the open market in the last 12 months. 4 sold $10m, $1m of it under preset trading plans.
- ROBOTTI ROBERTDirectorSold
- Date
- 16 September 2026
- Shares
- 10,300
- Price
- $89.85
- Value
- $925,449
- Hudson Daniel A.EVP, CLO & Corporate SecretarySoldunder a preset trading plan
- Date
- 2 September 2026
- Shares
- 15,000
- Price
- $99.08
- Value
- $1m
- Traub KennethDirectorSold
- Date
- 2 September 2026
- Shares
- 10,000
- Price
- $99.00
- Value
- $990,000
- Rubio Samuel REVP, CFO & CAOSold
- Date
- 12 August 2026
- Shares
- 17,705
- Price
- $91.56
- Value
- $2m
- Hudson Daniel A.EVP, CLO & Corporate SecretarySold
- Date
- 10 August 2026
- Shares
- 5,000
- Price
- $89.01
- Value
- $445,050
- Hudson Daniel A.EVP & GENERAL COUNSELSold
- Date
- 5 March 2026
- Shares
- 5,195
- Price
- $80.56
- Value
- $418,509
- Rubio Samuel REVP, CFO & CAOSold
- Date
- 5 March 2026
- Shares
- 22,461
- Price
- $80.05
- Value
- $2m
- Hudson Daniel A.EVP & GENERAL COUNSELSold
- Date
- 23 February 2026
- Shares
- 15,000
- Price
- $77.50
- Value
- $1m
- Hudson Daniel A.EVP & GENERAL COUNSELSold
- Date
- 11 February 2026
- Shares
- 10,000
- Price
- $70.01
- Value
- $700,100
| Date | Who | Did | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 September 2026 | ROBOTTI ROBERT Director | Sold | 10,300 | $89.85 | $925,449 |
| 2 September 2026 | Hudson Daniel A. EVP, CLO & Corporate Secretary | Sold under a preset trading plan | 15,000 | $99.08 | $1m |
| 2 September 2026 | Traub Kenneth Director | Sold | 10,000 | $99.00 | $990,000 |
| 12 August 2026 | Rubio Samuel R EVP, CFO & CAO | Sold | 17,705 | $91.56 | $2m |
| 10 August 2026 | Hudson Daniel A. EVP, CLO & Corporate Secretary | Sold | 5,000 | $89.01 | $445,050 |
| 5 March 2026 | Hudson Daniel A. EVP & GENERAL COUNSEL | Sold | 5,195 | $80.56 | $418,509 |
| 5 March 2026 | Rubio Samuel R EVP, CFO & CAO | Sold | 22,461 | $80.05 | $2m |
| 23 February 2026 | Hudson Daniel A. EVP & GENERAL COUNSEL | Sold | 15,000 | $77.50 | $1m |
| 11 February 2026 | Hudson Daniel A. EVP & GENERAL COUNSEL | Sold | 10,000 | $70.01 | $700,100 |
From Form 4 filings: insiders must report trades in their own company's shares within two days.
Warning signs in its filings
Problems the company itself reported to the SEC, in its own words.
None of the warning signs we check for were found.
We look for five warning signs: doubt it can keep going, weak checks on its own accounts, a notice that its past accounts can't be relied on, a change of auditor, and one customer bringing in a big share of sales. We don't check lawsuits, investigations or debt yet.
We checked the auditor's report, internal controls, restatement notices, auditor changes and big customers in the 10-K filed 2 Mar 2026, plus the 10-Q filed 3 Aug 2026 and 7 later 8-Ks.
A 10-K is the yearly report every US company files with the SEC. An 8-K is a short notice of a big event.
What could go wrong
Cheap for a reason is the question the numbers cannot answer.
Whether the price already reflects the risks is what the deep dive is for.
What changed in the risks this year
Companies must list what could hurt them each year. These are the parts that changed since last year’s report.
The foregoing risks apply to the timing, completion and anticipated benefits of the proposed acquisition of the Wilson Companies, which may be delayed or not occur at all, may divert management ’ s attention, or may result in legal proceedings, any of which could negatively impact our operating results and ongoing business. Moreover, if we complete the Wilson Transaction, we may be unable to integrate the operations and business successfully.
Could happenOn February 22, 2026, we entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (Agreement) to acquire all outstanding shares of Wilson Sons Ultratug Participações S.A and its affiliate Atlantic Offshore Services S.A. (collectively, the Wilson Companies) from Wilson Sons S.A., Ultranav International II, S.A. and Remolcadores Ultratug Limitada (collectively, the Wilson Sellers). The acquisition and related agreements (Wilson Transaction) is subject to the satisfaction (or, where permitted, waiver) of certain conditions set forth in the Agreement, including, among others, (i) the approval of the Brazilian antitrust authority, (ii) the consent of the lenders to the Wilson Companies’ to the change of control, (iii) the absence of any final and non-appealable order from an applicable governmental body that prohibits the transaction or makes the consummation of the transaction illegal, (iv) the delivery of certain financial statements to us to allow the Company to satisfy its reporting obligations with the SEC, and (v) the absence of a Material Adverse Effect as defined in the Agreement. Therefore, the Wilson Transaction may not be completed or may not be completed as timely as expected, and we may be required to pay a termination fee in certain circumstances, as further described in the Agreement.
Read moreThe foregoing risks apply to the timing, completion and anticipated benefits of the proposed acquisition of the Wilson Companies, which may be delayed or not occur at all, may divert management ’ s attention, or may result in legal proceedings, any of which could negatively impact our operating results and ongoing business. Moreover, if we complete the Wilson Transaction, we may be unable to integrate the operations and business successfully.
Furthermore, failure to complete the Wilson Transaction could adversely affect our business and the market price of our common shares in a number of ways, including to the extent that the current market price of our shares reflects an assumption that the acquisition will be consummated. We also have expended, and continue to expend, significant management time and resources in an effort to complete the acquisition, which may have a negative impact on our ongoing business and operations. The Wilson Transaction may lead to litigation against the parties or their directors and officers, which could be distracting to management and may, in the future, require us to incur significant costs.
Read moreThe foregoing risks apply to the timing, completion and anticipated benefits of the proposed acquisition of the Wilson Companies, which may be delayed or not occur at all, may divert management ’ s attention, or may result in legal proceedings, any of which could negatively impact our operating results and ongoing business. Moreover, if we complete the Wilson Transaction, we may be unable to integrate the operations and business successfully.
Could happen● complexities associated with managing the larger, more complex, integrated business, including difficulty addressing possible differences in operational philosophies and the challenge of integrating complex systems, technology, networks and other assets of the two companies in a seamless manner;
Read more
The deep dive
Everything above is arithmetic on public filings. The deep dive reads the last ten years of annual reports, the proxy statements, and the earnings calls, then argues the case the way Buffett, Klarman, and Hohn would, and checks every claim against the source.
- What the business is worth, as a range, and the margin of safety at today’s price
- Prices to start buying, buy, and buy hard
- The three things that would make this a mistake
- Every number footnoted to the filing it came from
Your first deep dive is free.
Not advice. Numbers on this page come from SEC filings and are updated each night; prices are updated again after the US market closes. The five-year figures are rounded.