Everforth
EFOR on NYSE. Everforth sells technology consulting and digital engineering services to businesses and government agencies. Market value $1.5bn.
Price checks use the past 12 months to June 2026. Quality checks use five annual reports, the latest for the year to December 2025.
Should I look at this?
Worth a closer look
Why it could be worth it
What to watch out for
Nothing stood out in the numbers we check.
This is not advice. Check the numbers below.
For every $100 of what the whole company costs, it produced $14.92 of spare cash in the past 12 months. A savings account pays about $4.
You pay 14.3 years of operating profit for the business. The average large US company costs around 18.
Each dollar kept in the business earns 10 cents a year. Above 10 is good.
Quality score: 75 of 100. Price score: 93 of 100. Our list needs 70 on quality and 60 on price.
$36.14 a share, 114% above its 1-year low
Over the past year the price has ranged from $16.90 to $54.94.
Pays no dividend
Prices from Monday’s close (5 October).
Five years of cash, in billions
| Revenue | |||||
| Revenue | $4.0bn | $4.6bn | $4.5bn | $4.1bn | $4.0bn |
| Operating margin | |||||
| Operating margin | 8.8% | 8.9% | 8.2% | 7.4% | 5.8% |
| Debt to equity | |||||
| Debt to equity | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.55 | 0.58 | 0.65 |
| Shares outstanding | |||||
| Shares outstanding | 0.05bn | 0.05bn | 0.04bn | 0.04bn | 0.04bn |
Health checks
- Free cash flow positive5 of 5 years
- Accounting looks honest (Beneish)Nothing unusual
- Financial strength (Piotroski)5 of 9
- Profit backed by cash (accruals)Yes
- Debt0.65× equity
- Revenue growth, five yearsSlow, 2.6% a year
- Buying back its own sharesYes, 18% fewer since 2021
The quarter to June 2026
How the business did, compared with the same quarter a year earlier.
- Sales: $1 billion last quarter, about the same as a year ago.
- Profit: $14 million, down 52% on a year ago.
- It keeps 5 cents of each $1 of sales as operating profit, down from 6 cents a year earlier.
- Spare cash over the past 12 months: $221 million, down from $339 million.
- 7% fewer shares than a year ago. Each share owns a bit more of the company.
- Debt is $1.3 billion more than cash, up from $1.1 billion a year ago.
- Sales did not grow on a year ago in any of the last 4 quarters.
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $1.0bn |
| December 2024 | $985m |
| March 2025 | $968m |
| June 2025 | $1.0bn |
| September 2025 | $1.0bn |
| December 2025 | $980m |
| March 2026 | $968m |
| June 2026 | $1.0bn |
| Quarter to | Amount |
|---|---|
| September 2024 | $48m |
| December 2024 | $42m |
| March 2025 | $21m |
| June 2025 | $29m |
| September 2025 | $38m |
| December 2025 | $25m |
| March 2026 | $6m |
| June 2026 | $14m |
From the company's quarterly reports to the SEC.
Dates
- Next results (estimated)
- n/a
- Last annual report (10-K)
- 25 February 2026
- Next quarterly (estimated, 10-Q)
- 30 October 2026
Who owns it
3 long-term investors we follow own it, unchanged from 3 last quarter. 247 funds in all.
- Barrow HanleyBarrow Hanley team
- Value
- $5,522
- Share of fund
- <0.1%
| Fund | Value | Share of that fund | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hotchkis & WileyHotchkis & Wiley team | $15m | <0.1% | Added |
| Tweedy, BrowneTweedy Browne partners | $2m | 0.1% | New |
| Barrow HanleyBarrow Hanley team | $5,522 | <0.1% |
Sold out this quarter
Largest holders overall
- BlackRock$133mAdded
- Vanguard Portfolio Management$59m
- AQR Capital Management$38mCut
- D. E. Shaw$34mAdded
- State Street$33mAdded
- Vanguard Capital Management$32m
- Dimensional Fund Advisors LP$29mCut
- Geode Capital Management$25m
- Pathstone Holdings$23mAdded
- Goldman Sachs Group$20mAdded
From 13F filings for the quarter ended 30 June 2026.
Big holders and activists
5 investors own more than 5%.
- BlackRock, Inc.Passive investor15.7%Since 31 March 2026
- Vanguard Portfolio ManagementPassive investor8.1%Since 31 March 2026
- AQR Capital Management, LLCPassive investorat least 6.1%(filed with 1 related holder)Since 31 March 2026
- Vanguard Capital ManagementPassive investor5.0%Since 31 March 2026
- FMR LLCPassive investorat least 4.1%−3.9 pts(filed with 1 related holder)Since 30 September 2025
- The Vanguard GroupPassive investorSold down below 5%Since 13 March 2026
| Holder | Stake | Since | |
|---|---|---|---|
BlackRock, Inc. Passive investor | 15.7% | 31 March 2026 | |
Vanguard Portfolio Management Passive investor | 8.1% | 31 March 2026 | |
AQR Capital Management, LLC Passive investor | at least 6.1% (filed with 1 related holder) | 31 March 2026 | |
Vanguard Capital Management Passive investor | 5.0% | 31 March 2026 | |
FMR LLC Passive investor | at least 4.1%−3.9 pts (filed with 1 related holder) | 30 September 2025 | |
The Vanguard Group Passive investor | Sold down below 5% | 13 March 2026 |
From Schedule 13D and 13G filings: anyone owning more than 5% must file one.
What insiders did
In the last 12 months, 13 insiders bought $2m of shares on the open market.
- Dyer Joseph WendellDirectorBought
- Date
- 29 April 2026
- Shares
- 1,112
- Price
- $22.47
- Value
- $24,987
- Iyer SadasivamPresidentBought
- Date
- 28 April 2026
- Shares
- 1,110
- Price
- $22.67
- Value
- $25,164
- Cunningham RoseChief Accounting OfficerBought
- Date
- 28 April 2026
- Shares
- 1,125
- Price
- $22.27
- Value
- $25,054
- Obermaier Patricia LDirectorBought
- Date
- 27 April 2026
- Shares
- 2,500
- Price
- $20.61
- Value
- $51,525
- Lindstrom CarolDirectorBought
- Date
- 27 April 2026
- Shares
- 247
- Price
- $20.15
- Value
- $4,977
- Callaghan Brian J.DirectorBought
- Date
- 27 April 2026
- Shares
- 5,121
- Price
- $20.27
- Value
- $103,803
- Iyer SadasivamPresidentBought
- Date
- 24 April 2026
- Shares
- 1,725
- Price
- $19.30
- Value
- $33,290
- Hanson Theodore S.Chief Executive Officer, DirectorBought
- Date
- 24 April 2026
- Shares
- 51,965
- Price
- $19.24
- Value
- $999,807
- Frantz Mark A.DirectorBought
- Date
- 24 April 2026
- Shares
- 3,800
- Price
- $18.92
- Value
- $71,896
- Painter Jennifer HankesSVP, Chief Legal OfficerBought
- Date
- 24 April 2026
- Shares
- 2,500
- Price
- $20.03
- Value
- $50,075
| Date | Who | Did | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 29 April 2026 | Dyer Joseph Wendell Director | Bought | 1,112 | $22.47 | $24,987 |
| 28 April 2026 | Iyer Sadasivam President | Bought | 1,110 | $22.67 | $25,164 |
| 28 April 2026 | Cunningham Rose Chief Accounting Officer | Bought | 1,125 | $22.27 | $25,054 |
| 27 April 2026 | Obermaier Patricia L Director | Bought | 2,500 | $20.61 | $51,525 |
| 27 April 2026 | Lindstrom Carol Director | Bought | 247 | $20.15 | $4,977 |
| 27 April 2026 | Callaghan Brian J. Director | Bought | 5,121 | $20.27 | $103,803 |
| 24 April 2026 | Iyer Sadasivam President | Bought | 1,725 | $19.30 | $33,290 |
| 24 April 2026 | Hanson Theodore S. Chief Executive Officer, Director | Bought | 51,965 | $19.24 | $999,807 |
| 24 April 2026 | Frantz Mark A. Director | Bought | 3,800 | $18.92 | $71,896 |
| 24 April 2026 | Painter Jennifer Hankes SVP, Chief Legal Officer | Bought | 2,500 | $20.03 | $50,075 |
From Form 4 filings: insiders must report trades in their own company's shares within two days.
Warning signs in its filings
Problems the company itself reported to the SEC, in its own words.
None of the warning signs we check for were found.
We look for five warning signs: doubt it can keep going, weak checks on its own accounts, a notice that its past accounts can't be relied on, a change of auditor, and one customer bringing in a big share of sales. We don't check lawsuits, investigations or debt yet.
We checked the auditor's report, internal controls, restatement notices, auditor changes and big customers in the 10-K filed 25 Feb 2026, plus the 10-Q filed 31 Jul 2026 and 5 later 8-Ks.
A 10-K is the yearly report every US company files with the SEC. An 8-K is a short notice of a big event.
What could go wrong
Cheap for a reason is the question the numbers cannot answer.
Whether the price already reflects the risks is what the deep dive is for.
What changed in the risks this year
Companies must list what could hurt them each year. These are the parts that changed since last year’s report.
We outsource certain aspects of our business operations, which could result in disruption, unexpected increased costs, and reputational risk.
Could happenWe have recently outsourced, and may further outsource, certain back-office support functions to a third-party vendor in an effort to improve efficiency, strengthen our operations, and capture cost savings. As a result, we depend on a single third-party vendor relationship to ensure that certain of our business needs are sufficiently met, and there is no guarantee that such third party will be able to provide an adequate level of support and perform in accordance with our expectations. Our outsourcing arrangement thus exposes us to additional risks, including, among others, potential disruptions to our business operations, unexpected costs, reputational risk, and risks related to applicable laws and public perceptions about outsourcing. In addition, it could be difficult and costly, or potentially adversely affect our business continuity and margins, if we need to replace the vendor for performance or economic reasons.
Read moreOur results of operations could be adversely affected if we cannot successfully keep pace with technological changes in the development and implementation of our services.
Could happenWe have been integrating AI into our business and services in both the commercial and government markets to meet client demand and to maintain competitiveness in a highly competitive and rapidly evolving market. We have made substantial investments in developing and supporting AI capabilities and services, and we anticipate making further investments in the future. If we are unable to quickly develop, adopt, and deploy AI technologies, we risk falling behind our industry competitors. In addition to facing significant competition from other companies that are developing AI technologies, our own clients may develop their own internal AI-related capabilities, which could lead to reduced demand for our services or solutions. Additionally, while AI is currently the focus of significant investment and strategic prioritization, there is a risk that if the expected value of AI does not materialize at scale, or if high-profile AI failures emerge, clients may reassess their AI plans, which could lead to reduced spending and negatively impact our financial condition and results of operations.
Read moreWe outsource certain aspects of our business operations, which could result in disruption, unexpected increased costs, and reputational risk.
Could happenAs a result of outsourcing, we may experience reduced control over processes and quality, leading to inconsistencies, unmet standards, and misalignment with our strategic goals, impacting our brand. Thus, our business could be adversely impacted if we are unable to effectively manage this third-party relationship and the agreements under which our third-party vendor operates. Further, unexpected costs or failure to achieve projected savings may negate the intended benefits of outsourcing.
Read morePerformance under contracts, including those on which we have partnered with third parties, may be adversely affected if we or the third parties fail to deliver on commitments, or otherwise breach obligations to our clients.
Could happenOur strategic alliances and third-party partnerships often involve complex cooperation and resource sharing, and their success depends on the continued alignment of goals and effective coordination. There is no guarantee that our current partners will continue to collaborate with us on favorable terms, or at all. The loss of a significant partner, or the failure of an alliance to achieve its intended objectives, could result in a direct and immediate loss of referrals and future opportunities. The failure of an alliance could also harm our reputation and make it more difficult to form new partnerships in the future.
Read more
The deep dive
Everything above is arithmetic on public filings. The deep dive reads the last ten years of annual reports, the proxy statements, and the earnings calls, then argues the case the way Buffett, Klarman, and Hohn would, and checks every claim against the source.
- What the business is worth, as a range, and the margin of safety at today’s price
- Prices to start buying, buy, and buy hard
- The three things that would make this a mistake
- Every number footnoted to the filing it came from
Your first deep dive is free.
Not advice. Numbers on this page come from SEC filings and are updated each night; prices are updated again after the US market closes. The five-year figures are rounded.